Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1949

Dwight L. King v. Union Pacific Railroad Company
: Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Bryan P. Leverich; M. J. Bronson; A. U. Miner; Howard F. Coray; COunsel for Defendant and
Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, King v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., No. 7338 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1108

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
DWIGHT L. KING, Administrator of
the Estate of WENDELL 0. JORGENSEN, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
7338

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMpANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
E OF UTAH

. F.·
•

--,-1.
.

~l- :-1. V_i
j(_ ·_}
*

.. ··\ . , . . 9
: \) 1;:.-.

U

oii"R-K.-s~Ji~tM"E-cauRr.-mA"H

BRYAN P. LEVEHICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. CORAY,
Counsel for
Defendant and Appellant.

ARROW PRESS, SALT LAKE

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS ...

1

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .

1

,THE F .AJCTS .................. .

3

ISSUE NO. I. THAT THE DEFENDANT FAILED
TO FURNISH DECEDENT A REASONABLY
SAFE PLACE TO WORK WHEN IT REQUIRED HIM TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES
FROM THE PLATFORM OF THE CABOOSE . .

6

ISSUE NO. II. THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS
NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO FURNISH
AND

MAINTAIN

~CHAIN

AND HOOK

A

PROPER

~CROSS

SAFETY

TH·E OPEN-

ING IN THE RAILIN G ON THE END OF
1

THE CABOOSE . .

9

ISSUE NO. III. THAT T'HE DEFENDANT WAS
NEGLIGENT IN SHOVING THE CAB008E
AHEAD OF THE ENGINE

....... '..

12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued

Page
ISSUE

NO.

IV.

THAT THE

DEFENDANT

FAILED TO FURNISH DECEDENT A SAFE
PLACE TO WORK IN THAT THE CABOOSE,
OWING TO ITS SIZE, WEIGHT AND CONSTRUCTION, SWAYED FROM SIDE TO SIDE
AND PITCHED UP AND DOWN WHEN BEING SHOVED ALONG THE TRACKS AT
THE POINT OF THE ACCIDENT ..

19-

24

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

. . . . . . . . 24

ARGUMENT

STATUTES CITED

U. C. A. 1943, 104-40-7 ..

................ 25, 46,47

TExTS CITED

39 Am. Jur., New Trial, Sec. 134, p. 143 ........... 44, 45
20 R. C. L. 277 ..

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

CASES CITED

Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry. Co., 319 U. S. 350,
87 L. Ed. 1444, 63 Sup. Ct. 1062 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued

Page
Coray v. Southern Pac. Co., 335 U. S. 520

52

Ellis v. Union Pac. R. Co., 329 U. S. 649, 91 L. Ed.
572, 67 Sup. Ct. 598 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52

James v. Robertson, 39 Utah 414, 117 P. 1068, 2
N. C. C. A. 782
............. 42, 43, 46
Klinge v. Southern Pac. Co., 89 Utah 284, 57 P.
(2) 367 ................................... 50, 51
Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. S. 645, 90 L. Ed. 916,
66 Sup. Ct. 740 ............................. 51, 52
Moser v. Zion's Co-op. Mercantile Inst., Utah - ,
197 P. (2) 136 ........................ 27, 39, 40, 41
Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P. (2) 176 ...... 26, 30
State v. Cooper,- Utah-, 201 P. (2) 764 . .. .. . ..

39

Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 321 U. S. 29, 88 L.
Ed. 520, 64 Sup. Ct. 409 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

Utah State Bank v. Livingston, 69 Utah 284, 254 P. 781

44

Valiotis v. Utah-Apex Mining Co., 55 Utah 151, 184
P. 802 . _.. _. _. _. _.......................... 44, 46
White v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 8 Utah 56, 29
P. 1030 _
_ __ .... _..
................

43

Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 . . .

49

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utab
DWIGHT L. KING, Administrator of
the Estate of WENDELL 0. JORGENSEN, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
7338

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMpANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF F.A!CTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as in the court below.
Where the italics are ours it is so indicated.
This action was brought under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, (45 U. S.C. A., Sec. 51, et seq.), hereinafter
referred to as the F. E. L. A., by the administrator of the
estate of Wendell 0. Jorgensen to recover for the alleged
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wrongful death of Jorgensen occurring in the course of his
employment with the defendant company as a brakeman.
The case has been tried twice. At the first trial, the
Honorable Clarence E. Baker presiding, the jury returned
a verdict against the plaintiff of "no cause of action" (R.
132). Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial (R. 136),
which the court granted (R. 178), and in connection with
the granting of said motion filed a written memorandum of
decision ( R. 179) . The case was retried, the Honorable J.
Allan Crockett presiding, and resulted in a verdict and
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $75,000.00 (R. 260).
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds,
among others, of excessive damages. The court made an
order granting said motion unless plaintiff consented within
ten days to a reduction in the judgment to $50,000.00 (R.
284), and denying defendant's motion for a new trial in
the event plaintiff consented to such remittitur. Plaintiff
filed its written consent to reduction of said judgment to
$50,000.00 (R.. 286). Thereafter the defendant timely
served and filed its notice of appeal (R. 301) from said
judgment, setting forth therein that it did not intend to
assign error as to any proceedings in the second trial but
intended only to assign as error the order of the Honorable
Clarence E. Baker in granting plaintiff's motion for a
new trial following the first trial of said action. Plaintiff
thereupon sought to cross-appeal assigning as error the
action of the Honorable J. Allan Crockett following the
second trial in requiring a remittitur by plaintiff as a
condition to denying defendant's motion for a new trial
(R. 307A). This cross-appeal, after a hearing, was dis·
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missed by this court on June 1, 1949. This appeal seeks
a review of the action of the Honorable Clarence E. Baker
in granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial after the
jury had returned a verdict in favor of the defendant of
uno cause of action." The nature of the sole assignment of
error herein made requires a comprehensive statement of
the facts.
THE FACTS

The defendant maintains a branch line of railroad that
runs generally north and south, paralleling the main line
between Idaho Falls on the north and Goshen Junction on
the south. This branch line lies east of the main line and
is known as the Goshen Branch. The stations thereon,
moving from Idaho Falls south, are : Orvin, Lincoln, Lincoln
Junction, Wilkinson, Ammon, Hackman, Indian, Gerrard,
Cox, Goshen, Anton and Goshen Junction, a distance of
27.7 miles (Defendant's Ex. 3; R. 22). Operations on this
line are seasonal and involve the setting out of empty cars
at the above named stations and picking them up and returning them to Idaho Falls or Lincoln when they are
loaded. The traffic is principally in beets, some potatoes,
and pumice stone which is picked up at one station, Indian,
and the operation is referred to as the Lincoln beet job.
The Utah-Idaho Sugar Company maintains a factory at
Lincoln. The job was set up September 22, 1947 and traffic
such as indicated above was handled until January 10, 1948,
at which time the service was discontinued. It is a daily
operation, including Sundays, once it starts and the deceased had worked every day from the time the job was
set up, September 22, 1947, until the day of the accident.
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Customarily, and on the day of the accident, the crew works
doing switching between Idaho Falls and Lincoln and at
Orvin, which is between these two stations, in the morning. It was the custom, as on the day in question, for the
crew to return to Idaho Falls for their noonday meal and
in the afternoon proceed south as far along the branch
line toward Goshen Junction as was necessary to take care
of the business of setting out empties at the various statipns where needed and picking up such loads of beets,
potatoes, and pumice stone as were to be moved. The train
was in "work train service" and operated out of Idaho Falls
under a "work order." There are no station agents at any
of the stations south of Lincoln Junction and the uwork
order" referred to authorized the crew to proceed along this
line at will doing whatever work was necessary. The train
involved at the moment of the accident consisted of a steam
locomotive, headed south-the direction in which the movement was being made-ahead of which was being shoved a
caboose, with ten empty gondolas trailing behind the engine.
The crew consisted of Edward J. Freeman, conductor;
James S. Stoddard, engineer ; a fireman by the name of
Eaton, whose whereabouts were unknown at the time of the
trial and who did not testify; Paul Croft, rear brakeman;
and the deceased Jorgensen, head brakeman. The deceased
as head brakeman was riding on the leading platform of the
caboose together with Paul Croft the other brakeman as
the train proceeded south from Ammon. It was a nice day,
the caboose door was closed, and Conductor Freeman was
inside the caboose working at his desk. Approximately onehalf mile south of Ammon, at about 2 :'50 p. m., while the
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train was traveling from 15 to 20 miles an hour, deceased
fell from the caboose platform in front of the moving equipment and was killed instantly. The defendant admitted
that it and the deceased were mutually engaged in interstate commerce by rail as employer and employe at the time
of the accident.
In the instructions four specific allegations of negligence were submitted to the jury, the substance thereof
being as follows :
I. That the defendant failed to furnish decedent
a reasonably safe place to work when it required
him to perform his duties from the platform of
the caboose.
IT. That the defendant was negligent in failing to
furnish and maintain a proper safety chain and
hook across the opening in the railing on the
end of the caboose.
Ill. That the defendant was negligent in shoving
the caboose ahead of the engine.
IV. That the defendant failed to furnish decedent
a safe place to work in that the caboose, owing
to its size, weight and construction, swayed
from side to side and pitched up and down
when being shoved along the tracks at the point
of the accident.
(R. 103.)
The defendant denied its negligence in each and all
of the foregoing particulars, charged the deceased with
contributory negligence, and charged the deceased with
negligence that was the sole proximate cause of the accident (R. 32-36; 105).
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All of the evidence bearing on each of the issues set
out above is segregated and presented in connection with
the issue to which it is pertinent, although there is of
necessity some overlapping; minor portions of the evidence
having pertinency to more than one issue. The above general statement is supported by the detailed reference to
the record hereinafter made.

ISSUE NO. I
THAT THE DE·FENDANT FAILED TO FURNISH
DECEDENT A REASONABLY SAFE PLACE TO
WORK WHEN IT REQUIRED HIM TO PERFORM
HIS DUTIES FROM THE PLATFORM OF THE
CABOOSE.
According to Paul Croft, who was riding the caboose
platform with Jorgensen at the time of the accident, it
was customary for both the head and rear brakemen to
take positions on the platform as the train moved along
to Goshen Junction ( R. 27, 28) ; that the brakemen had
the duty of looking out ahead for livestock that might be
along the right of way and for vehicular traffic that might
be at or near crossings (R. 42); that there was on the end
of the caboose and where either of the brakemen could
operate it what is known as a tail hose which carried the
air in the train line and had a valve by which one of the
brakemen could set the air stopping the train, if necessitated,
and also enabled the brakemen to operate a whistle. At the
time of the accident Jorgensen was standing on the caboose
platform six inches or a foot behind the safety chain, with
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his left hand on the fourth rung from the bottom of the
ladder which runs from the platform to the top of the
caboose (R. 40; see Plaintiff's Exs. C, D, and I). The
platform of the caboose was thirty inches in width from
the end wall of the caboose to the railing on the end of the
caboose and was six feet three inches from side to side, in
good condition, without defects of any kind. Jorgensen's
duties also involved, as did the duties of all the train crew,
inspection of the train as it moved, which inspection from
the leading platform of the caboose would require his leaning out from the left or right hand side of the platform
(R. 396). At the time of the accident he had no duties to
perform and was performing no duty except riding and
looking forward (R. 61).
The conductor, Edward James Freeman, testified that
it was not necessary for the brakemen to be on the platform
of the caboose to perform their duties as there was an
emergency valve inside the caboose (R. 341, 342), and, as
the exhibits show the caboose had windows in the end wall,
the track ahead could have been observed from inside the
caboose. Moreover, the engineer, James S. Stoddard, had
an unobstructed view straight ahead and was able to look
forward along the track and would have been able to do
so from the front window of the cab, although at the time
of the accident it was a nice day and he was leaning out
of the cab and having no difficulty in seeing all crossings
(R. 427). He was whistling for all crossings on this occasion; he did so regardless of whether some brakeman on
the caboose platform whistled, and considered it one of his
duties at the time and place to watch for crossings and
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whistle for them (R. 428). Conductor Freeman testified.
that it was not unusual for Croft and Jorgensen to be on
the caboose platform a~d it was, in fact, the usual, customary thing and the proper place for them to be. At the time
of the accident Croft was standing on the right-hand side of
the caboose platform, facing fo!ward, with one hand holding a grab-iron which is fastened to the end wall of the
caboose. Jorgensen and Croft went to work when this job
started, September 22, 19'47, and both had ridden this
caboose platform every day. At the time of the accident
the caboose was traveling, according to Groft, at approximately 20 miles an hour ( R. 57) , and on cross-examination
he placed the speed at from 15 to 20 miles per hour, which
he testified was not an unusual speed on this track at the
point of the accident (R. 109). That the grabirons on each
side of the end wall of the caboose are to aid in getting
on and off and to hold on to while riding (R. 112). Croft
further testified that he was holding on more out of habit
than because of the riding qualities of the caboose (R. 115).
That he was talking just "ordinary talk" and turned his
head and was looking out to the side when he heard a commotion, turned his head back, and could see Brakeman
Jorgensen halfway between the caboose and the ground;
that Jorgensen fell face forward with his hands out in
front of him and it looked to Croft like he lit on his hands
and feet. He fell inside the rails toward the left. That the
noise he heard sounded like metal coming against metal
(R. 57, 58) ; that he immediately crossed over to the air
valve and pulled the air, bringing the train to a stop within
160 to 200 feet (R. 58, 59). Croft was unable to say where
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Jorgensen's right hand was or what he was doing with it
(R. 112). Before the accident and while Croft and Jorgensen were on the platform the safety chain was across the
opening and in position (R. 58). That Jorgensen had, just
prior to the accident, sounded a whistle for a crossing and
that it was approximately one-quarter or one-half mile to
the next crossing (R. 61); that he had no duties to perform
before they came to the next crossing except to watch for
livestock or. anything that might obstruct the movement of
the train (R. 61); that the fireman's duty, as well as the
engineer's, was to keep a lookout ahead on his side of the
engine (R. 129); that the engineer was whistling for all
crossings ( R. 128) ; that Jorgensen was not inspecting the
train at the time of the accident, nor was the witness, and
that Jorgensen's duty of inspecting had nothing to do with
the accident (R. 13,3); that he heard no outcry of any kind
when Jorgensen fell (R. 134); that Jorgensen could have
stood any place on the platform, either to the left or the
right side or behind the ladder, in the performance of his
duties.
Conductor Freeman testified that after the accident
he examined the platform, the chain, and the hook and that
there was nothing about the platform that could have caused
or contributed to Jorgensen's falling (R. 333).
ISSUE NO. II
THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN
FAILING TO FURNISH AND MAINTAIN A
PROPER SAFETY eHAIN AND HOOK ACROSS
THE OPENING IN THE RAILING ON THE END
OF THE CABOOSE.
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The safety chain which was attached to the caboose at
the time of the accident was received in evidence as defendant's Exhibit No. 1. It was removed from the caboose
the day after the accident at the direction of defendant's
witness Melvin E. Hurd and its custody accounted for until
it was offered in evidence. The bracket or eye into which
the hook fitted when the chain was up was welded to the
side of the ladder and would have necessitated the use of
a cutting torch to remove. Defendant's Exhibit No. 2 is a
bracket or eye which was made and is the same size and
dimensions as the one which was attached to the caboose
at the time of the accident (R. 308, 309). The witness Croft
testified that the purpose of the safety chain was to prevent
anyone from being thrown off the platform by any unexpected jerk or movement (R. 50); that when they left
Idaho Falls the chain was in place and hooked (R. 51) and
was hooked and in place immediately before Jorgensen fell
(R. 58); that the chain had a shorter hook than an ordinary
chain but owing to its length was tighter than an ordinary
chain when hooked (R. 51, 52, 129).
Fenton Wilson, a witness called by the plaintiff and
brother-in-law of the deceased, testified that he went to
the scene of the accident immediately afterwards and ex~
amined the chain and that by pushing down on the chain it
would come up and out and if hit from beneath it would
become disengaged ( R. 202) ; that the chain was tighter
when hooked, however,. than some chains the witness had
seen (R. 206); that the chain in question was not the
ordinary chain but that the chain introduced as plaintiff's
Exhibit G was (R. 206).
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A. L. Say, Mechanical Foreman at Idaho Falls, who
took the chain off the caboose after the accident and marked
it for identification with three chisel marks (R. 305),
testified that there was no such thing as a regulation safety
chain; that safety chains are not covered, nor are their
construction and specifications called for in the Safety
Appliance Act and that there is no standard chain, the
same being handmade. That he installed another chain
on the caboose to take the place of the one removed for use
in evidence and such chain was approximately the same
as the one removed. That the chains are not stamped out
on a machine but are made on a blacksmith's forge (R ..299).
That there is no regulation size hook for a caboose safety
chain and that they may be made in any dimensions the
railroad company sees fit, and that the hook on the chain
in question (Defendant's Exhibit 1) resembled the ordinary
hook used (R. 300).
Leo A. Williams, a witness for the plaintiff and
Mortician and County Coroner at Idaho Falls, was called
to the scene of the accident at about 3:15 p. m. (R. 187,
188). He testified that he examined the safety chain "very
closely," was accompanied at the time by the Sheriff of
the County and one of his deputies, and that he examined
the hook for the purpose of determining the manner in
which it could be hooked and unhooked (R. 188, 192); that
affixed as it was to the caboose it was not difficult to remove with a simple twist of the hand but that it required
a slight reverse and upward motion of the hand to disengage the hook from the eye (R. 184); that the hook had
to be raised in a vertical position and when hooked it was
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necessary to take hold of the hook itself and raise it in a
vertical position to unhook it (R. 195, 196); that it was
possible for the hook to rest on the bracket iron and not be
engaged in the eye or hooked but in such a position tha.t a
movement of the chain would jar it off; that some pressure
or force against the chain would dislodge it but only when
the hook was resting on top of the bracket and was not
completely hooked (R. 19'7).

r~t
fir~
;1w1:

Conductor Edward James Freeman testified that in
his opinion the hook on the safety chain was a good and
substantial hook and that it would have to be taken out,
that is, "unlatched" in some way to become disengaged
(R. 332).
Plaintiff's witness Croft testified that he did not think
the chain in question (Defendant's Ex. 1) was a proper
chain; that the hook was too small; and that he did think
plaintiff's Exhibit G was an ordinary standard safety
chain (R. 162, 163). He admitted on cross-examination
that he had told Melvin E. Hurd, Claim Agent, that Jorgensen "was closer to the center of the caboose near the safety
chain, which was a good strong chain equipped with good
hook, so that he was able to hold on to the steep upright
part of the ladder with his left hand" (R. 141-145).

ISSUE NO. III

Th~iig

«~(;

:r~~~ it

THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN ::~~l(:
SHOVING THE CABOOSE AHEAD OF THE t:itisl
ENGINE.
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Two operating rules having a bearing upon this issue
were read in evidence: Rule 802 (J), which reads as
~~ follows:
"Cars must not be handled ahead of engines
between stations, except when necessary to take
cars to or from a spur or in work train seTVice, and
the movement then must be for no greater distance
than necessary."
(R. 46.)
And Rule 802 (H), providing:

1.:.,

.....
• .J.-

"Running switches must not be made when
practicable to avoid doing so, and must not be made
over spring switches, in interlocking limits, with
ears containing explosives or inflammables, nor
when such movement might cause personal injury,
or damage to equipment or contents of cars.
"Before making a running switch, all members
of the crew must understand the movement to be
made; hand brakes and switches to be used must be
tested; there must be a trainman or yardman at the
brake, if necessary, and the engine must be run on
straight track when practicable."
(R. 131.)

The significance of the above rules lies in the fact that
:=: Rule 802 (J) implies some danger in pushing cars ahead
~~·:. of an engine and prohibits the same, except where it is
necessary to do so in order to take cars to or from a spur
or where it is being done in "work train service"; while
Rule 802 (H) prohibits the making of running switches
' when it is practicable to avoid doing so and prohibits run. · ning switches entirely under some circumstances. The running switch is throughout the record referred to as a "drop"
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and is sometimes known as a "flying switch." It may be
excusable for us to at this time indicate the significance of
the testimony under the issue now being discussed, the
plaintiff on the one hand seeking to prove the defendant
negligent by reason of the fact that it was at the time of
the accident permitting a caboose to be shoved ahead of
the engine, and the defendant on the other hand claiming
that such movement was permissible and within the exception of Rule 802 (J), due to the fact that it was necessary
to take cars to and from spurs on the Lincoln beet job, and
the train was actually in "work train service," both being
exceptions provided for in the rule. The defendant's position further being that the operation on the Goshen Branch
required either the shoving of the caboose ahead of the
engine, which was permissible under Rule 802 (J) in "work
train service," or the performing of a more dangerous operation-the making of a running switch or drop, which is
prohibited by Rule 802 (H) wherever it is practicable to
avoid it.
At the stations of Wilkinson, Ammon and Cox on the
Goshen Branch there were spur tracks, the one at Wilkinson holding three cars, the one at Ammon twenty-five cars,
and the one at Cox eight cars. There was also a spur at
Orvin, which is between Idaho Falls and Lincoln. At the
other stations there were sidings, that is, tracks connected
with the main line by switches at both ends and which
might be entered from either the north or the south with
equipment. The spurs mentioned were of course dead end
tracks and they ran from north to south, that is, they could
only be entered by equipment as it moved from north to
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south (R. 13). In working these spurs it was either necessary to shove the caboose ahead of the engine or to make
a running switch or drop (R. 13). The station of Cox, at
which is located a spur, is south of the point of the accident
and south of Indian where the ten empty gondolas were to
be set out on the day in question (Defendant's Ex. 3). Conductor Freeman testified that the crew does not know when
the train is made up at Idaho Falls whether there would be
any loaded cars ready to be taken off the spur at Cox, for
instance, or not (R. 416). The train on the day in question
had been made up by the yard force at Idaho Falls, which
was customary, and consisted of the caboose ahead of the
engine, ten empties immediately behind the engine, and
sixteen cars of beets behind the empties destined for the
sugar beet factory (R. 25). Eight cars of beets were set
out at Orvin and eight cars at Lincoln. At the time of the
accident the equipment consisted of the caboose ahead of
the engine and the ten empty gondolas trailing. The ten
empties were destined for Indian, which is a siding, and
of course the crew knew when they left Idaho Falls that
they would have to set these cars out at that place (R. 27).
Their orders for the afternoon of October 28, 1947 were
to work between Idaho Falls and Goshen Junction (R. 24).
They did not have any switching to perform at Wilkinson,
the first station below Lincoln Junction, nor at Ammon,
nor at Hackman (R. 25). There are no agents at any of the
t' stations below Lincoln, including the station of Cox, and
there is no way for the crew to tell whether or not cars
previously left on spurs such as at Cox are loaded and
(' ready to be taken out until they arrive at the station (R.
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324). The Lincoln beet job is simply a traveling switching
operation which goes down the branch line and picks up and
sets out cars when it is necessary to do so (R. 324). Conductor Freeman testified that on the day in question he
did not know whether he had any work to do at Cox or not;
that his intentions were to go beyond Indian to Cox and he
would have gone down to Cox if it had not been for the
accident (R. 337, 338) ; that owing to the fact that he did
not know what switching would be necessitated the caboose
was placed on the front to avoid the necessity of making a
"drop," which he considered more dangerous than shoving
the caboose ahead of the engine (R. 340); that he did not
know whether there would be cars on the spur at Cox to be
taken out or not when he left Idaho Falls to make the run
(R. 416). That he had worked the Lincoln beet job anumber of years (R. 3.24), and the work had always been performed by shoving the caboose ahead of the engine (R. 328);
that this was the more practical way, eliminating a lot of
switching movement, and was the proper method of operation (R. 329'); that cars are required to be dropped on this
operation unless the caboose is in front (R. 336) and he
considered it safer to have the caboose in front than to
make drops (R. 337-340). That if it had been necessary
to take cars off the spur at Cox it would have been necessary to make a drop if they had had the caboose behind the
engine (R. 413). That a "drop" is a hazardous operation at
1

I

11(K
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~mo~1

~~rric
1

' ~ 1Dl

any time (R. 394).
I

J. E. Brown, a witness for the plaintiff who knew
nothing about this accident, and was employed by the D.
& R. G. W. Railroad Company (R. 250) and was called
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simply to answer hypothetical questions, stated that on
"work trains" cars are sometimes run ahead of the engine
and sometimes cabooses are run ahead of the engine (R.
260); t}lat he has seen cabooses pushed ahead of the engine
many times and that that is the usual thing in the performance of some kinds of work.
The engineer, James S. Stoddard, with·31 years experience, testified that ~e had worked steadily on the Lincoln
beet job from September 22, 1947 until the day of the accident (R. 420) ; that it was a violation of the operating
rules to make a drop where it could be avoided (R. 428);
that dropping was considered dangerous and considered
more dangerous than shoving the caboose ahead of the
engine (R. 419); that Rule 802 (H) against making drops
is considered by railroad men to mean that dropping cars
or making running or flying switches should not be done
unless absolutely necessary (R. 434); that owing to the
spurs on the Goshen Branch it was necessary to have the
caboose ahead of the engine to avoid drops (R. 438). That
on the occasion in question the caboose was not moved
ahead any greater distance than was necessary and as provided in Rule 802 (J) (R. 439, 440). That the train in
question was known as a "work extra" and was in "work
train service" as mentioned in Rule 802 (J), permitting the
caboose to be shoved ahead of the engine (R. 438).
The witness H. G. Baker, called by the defendant,
testified that he had 38 years of service with the defendant
company and was at present Trainmaster at Pocatello (R.
442) ; that he had general direction over train and engine
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men and direction of train movements (R. 442), and had
supervision over the Goshen Branch on October 28, 1947
(R. 461). That the Lincoln beet job operated on a "work
order" and was in "work train service" within the meaning
of Rule 802 (J) (R. 443); that a train operating under
work orders came within the exception of Rule 802 (J)
permitting the caboose to be shoved ahead of the engine
(R. 443, 444) ; that the terms "work train order" and "work
train service" are in railroad operations used interchangeably (R. 478) ; that a "work train order" such as the train
in question was operating under on the date of the accident
does not indicate the freight or cars to be picked up or the
switching to be done, but is simply authority to operate over
a given stretch of railroad (R. 489) ; that the practice on
the Union Pacific was to shove cabooses ahead of engines
on branch lines generally in "work train service," that is,
where a train was assigned to handle any work that might
originate in the district, such as handling beets on the
Lincoln beet job (R. 463).
Plaintiff's witness Paul Croft testified on cross-examination that the train was a "work extra" and that it
worked at will over the entire Goshen Branch (R. 68, 69);
that drops are prohibited by Rule 802 (J) unless absolutely
necessary (R. 80) ; that if switching had beennecessary at
Cox it would have been necessary to have the caboose ahead
of the engine or make a drop, or shove back one mile to the
station of Gerrard (R. 89-93) ; that if they had had to make
a drop at Cox that would be considered hazardous (R. 94);
that it would be wrong to drop- cars on this job (H. 95, 96) ;
that they did not know whether they would have to drop cars
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or not on this trip and that was the reason the caboose was
shoved ahead of the engine ( R. 96, 97) . He also testified
that the usual method of doing the work on the Goshen
Branch was by dropping cars (R. 153) ; that they dropped
cars every day he worked on the job (R. 157) ; that if the
caboose had been in the rear no extra switching would have
been necessitated (R. 158) ; that he did not know they were
going to Cox the day of the accident (R. 158) ; that there
is greater danger in riding the platform of a caboose than
in making a drop (R. 159) ; that all the orders the crew
had on the day in question were the orders procured at Idaho
Falls permitting the train to move at will between two
designated points, viz, Idaho Falls and Goshen Junction,
and that that was the usual way this particular work train
operated (R. 177, 178).

ISSUE NO. IV
THAT THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO FURNISH
DECEDENT A SAFE PLACE TO WORK IN THAT
THE CABOOSE, OWING TO ITS SIZE, WEIGHT
AND· CONSTRUCTION, SWAYED FROM SIDE TO
SIDE AND PITCHED UP AND DOWN WHEN
BEING SHOVED ALONG THE TRACKS AT THE
POINT OF THE ACCIDENT.
Under this issue both the construction of the caboose
and the condition of the tracks at and near the point of
the accident were complained of by plaintiff. As to the
caboose, there is no dispute in the record but that the
caboose had been constructed by converting an automobile
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car. The work had been done at Grand Island, Nebraska, in
June and July of 1947 (R. 296-303). The caboose was put
on the Lincoln beet job when it was set up September 22,
1947 and was used daily until the accident (R. 296). It
was undisputed that the caboose did not have a cupola and
the testimony was that some newer types of cabooses are
constructed without cupolas (R. 3!60). Plaintiff's witness
Paul Croft testified that the caboose was larger both in
length and in height than an ordinary caboose (R. 00);
that he had ridden the caboose since the start of the beet
job and that it was a rough rider-rougher than an ordinary
caboose (R. 32-35) ; that it would sway from side to side
and bounce up and down ( R. 333, 334) ; that the caboose was
swaying from side to side and bouncing up and down just
before the accident (R. 57) ; that it swayed so badly that
it would throw one out of a seat and that one riding in the
caboose had to hold on to everything to get around in the
car, and that one would be thrown off the platform if he
did not hold on to something ( R. 117) ; that if one was up
ahead on the track watching the caboose it swayed so that
it appeared about to turn over; that the top of the caboose
would sway a foot to two feet on each side (R. 118) ; that
it would bounce up and down so bad that it would cause a
man's feet to leave the floor of the caboose two or three
inches (R. 119, 120) ; that the swaying of the ~aboose would
not cause a man to be thrown off the front end of the platform (R. 121, 122) ; that it was safer to stand where the
witness was standing than where Jorgensen took up his
position ('R. 124). This witness further testified that the
caboose as a whole was in good condition (R. 130). That
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he did not lose his footing because of the motion of the caboose (R. 137). That the speed at the time of the accident
was not unusual nor was there any unusual swaying, jerking or bouncing (R. 147).
Joseph A. Knox, a witness for the plaintiff, 70 years
of age, and who had had 45 years experience in train service
-25 years with the defendant company (R. 23:5), testified
that he had never ridden a caboose which had been converted from an automobile car and that he had never ridden
on the Goshen Branch at all ( R. 246) . He further testified
that he had observed automobile cars many times in motion
and that they would sway so much as to almost hit cars on
adjacent tracks; that the top of such cars would sway
laterally three feet on each side (R. 246'); that he had
never himself worked on automobile cars (R. 249).

t

The witness J. E. Brown, called by the plaintiff, testified that the platform on the caboose in question was about
the same length and width as on an ordinary caboose ( R.
251); that it was unsafe for men to ride on the platform
of a caboose (R. 253), because they might get jerked off
(R. 257) ; that any job on the railroad involving braking
was hazardous (R. -260); that he did not think the swaying
would cause a man to be jerked off the platform of a caboose
if he had hold of something (R. 258, 259); that swaying of
a caboose would not cause a man to be thrown off the end
of a platform (R. 259).
The witness Edward James Freeman, the conductor,
who was working at his desk inside the caboose at the time
of the accident testified that it was harder to write in this
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caboose than in an ordinary caboose; and that this caboose
was harder riding than an ordinary caboose ( R. 398) ; that
it was a good caboose for switching purposes and the job
they were on as it had an all-steel underframe (R. 389);
was a little more rigid than the ordinary caboose (R. 369).
That there was no vertical motion of this caboose and that
it rode as a usual and ordinary car of this kind rides (R.
401). That there was nothing unusual about the lateral
motion (R. 408). That the caboose was a very good caboose for the job it was being used on (R. 405).
As to the track, plaintiff's witness Paul Croft testified
that the caboose and train were running along smoothly,
between 15 and 20 miles per hour, at the time of the accident (R. 130); that at the point of the accident there
was not much ballasting, which would have made for a
smoother ride (R. 56) ; that the track was fairly level and
not rough (R. 104), and that there was nothing wrong with
the track that would cause the accident (R. 105); that when
ballasting is done with dirt, as it was on this branch and
at the point of the accident, it is piled high in the center
leaving the ends of the ties on each side considerably exposed for drainage purposes (R. 102, 103); that the track
as shown in plaintiff's Exhibits D, E and F was in the same
condition as at the time of the accident (R. 53); that so far
as he knew the track was in good condition (R. 102); that
there was no unusual swaying, jerking or bouncing at the
time of the accident ( R. 147) .
Conductor Freeman testified that the speed at the
time of the accident was about 15 miles per hour (R. 377),
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and that it was between 15 and 2{) miles per hour (R. 378);
that the speed limit at the place of the accident was 2'5 miles
per hour (R. 378); that at the time of the accident he was
in the caboose writing and looking over his papers; that the
caboose was running along smoothly at the time; that there
were no unusual jerks or jolts of any kind, and that there
was no application of the air immediately prior to the
accident ( R. 323) .
The engineer, James S. Stoddard, testified that at the
time of the accident they were traveling not to exceed 20
miles per hour, the train was operating smoothly, the speed
was uniform, and there was no unusual movement whatsoever (R. 417); that there was no application of the brakes
by him at any time (R. 418).
Defendant's witness, Charles C. Heaton, Section Foreman for 22 years on the Goshen Branch and having the
duty of maintaining the track at the point of the accident
(R. 282, 283), testified that his duty required his covering
- the territory at the scene of the accident every other day
(R. 284); that he knew where the accident took place (R.
285); that it was at a point one-half mile south of Ammon
by a motor car set-off (R. 293); that he had inspected the
track at the scene of the accident on October 28, 1947 (R.
284-287).

On March 11, 1948 the defendant had motion pictures
made by a professional motion picture producer simulating
the movement of the train at the time of the accident. The
same caboose was shoved ahead of the engine which was
pulling ten empty gondolas. The engine used was the same
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class of engine, the track was shown to be in substantially
the same condition, and it was shown that no repairs had
been made upon the caboose since the time of the accident.
Six runs were made from north to south at speeds of 15, 20,
25, and at between 15 and 20 miles per hour, two runs being
made at 20 miles per hour and two runs at between 15 and 20
miles per hour. The train was run from north to south at
the point of the accident. Trainmaster H. G. Baker rode the
leading platform of the caboose in the position Jorgensen
was supposed to have been standing. He did not hold on to
anything (R. 453) and, as the motion pictures (Defendant's Ex. 4) show, he had his hands in his pockets. The
court admitted the film in evidence and it was run in the
court room by a professional operator of moving picture
equipment and was run again in argument by defend-
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

~fu

ARGUMENT

~mot

~~~
THE TRIAL COURT WAS GUILTY OF AN ABUSE ~to!:
OF DISCRETION AND THEREIN ERRED IN
:imie!
GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW ~~e
TRIAL.
:whlrn

The trial court in its decision granting plaintiff's motion , . ~
for a new trial stated that it did so "primarily on the grounds ~ttl
stated in paragraph 8 of plaintiff's notice of intention to ~~
move for a new trial, and also upon the general grounds set ~·mn
n.A3" wru
forth in Section 104-40-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1i1't
(R. 17'9-180). Paragraph 8 referred to in plaintiff's notice
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of intention to move for a new trial was : "That the verdict
and judgment are contrary to the evidence and against
law" (R. 137). Section 104-40-7, Utah Code Annotated,
1943, referred to reads as follows: "The verdict of the jury
may also be vacated and a new trial granted by the court
in which the action is pending, on its own motion, without
the application of either of the parties, when there has been
such a plain disregard by the jury of the instructions of the
court or the evidence in the case as to satisfy the court that
the verdict was rendered under a misapprehension of such
instructions or under the influence of passion and prejudice."
It thus appears that the trial court's discretion was invoked
upon the theory that there was a plain disregard of the
evidence by the jury and a plain disregard of the instructions such as to convince the court that the verdict was
rendered under a misapprehension of the instructions or
under the influence of passion and prejudice. In "its decision
granting the motion for a new trial the court had this
further to say: "The jury by its verdict absolved the defendant of all negligence which was a proximate cause of
· the injuries to and the death of the decedent. It did this
despite the uncontroverted evidence ( 1) that the caboose
from which the decedent fell was being propelled ahead of
the locomotive and of the train, thereby rendering such an
accident as caused the death of the deceased possible, and
(2) that the safety chain mentioned in the evi~ence was
inadequate, at least that when it was put to the test it failed
to perform the function for which it was intended." * * *
"There was no doubt a misapprehension, or a disregard, on
the part of the jury either~ the evidence, or of the court's
instructions, or of both." (R. 179, 180.)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26

In Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P. (2d) 176, :~~
this court said :

"In order to eliminate speculation as to the basis
of the exercise of judicial discretion in granting new
trials, the record should show the reasons and make · .: .
it clear the court is not invading the province of the
jury. The trial court should indicate wherein there
was a plain disregard by the jury of the instructions
of the court or the evidence or what constituted bias
or prejudice on the part of the jury. If no reasons
need be given the province of the jury may be invaded at will. With no indication as to the basis for
the exercise of the power vested in the court to grant
new trials the appeal tribunal would be left to analyze
the matter from the evidence, the record and the in- .:;[structions. It would be required to search out
possible reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with the
trial court in the exercise of a discretion. The exercise of a judicial discretion must be based upon ~~;m~
some facts, notwithstanding great latitude is accorded the trial court in such matter." (Italics ours.)

The specific facts indicated by the court as a basis for
the exercise of its discretion in granting the motion for a ·'?..~
new trial are (1) that the caboose from which the decedent
fell was being propelled ahead of the locomotive and of the
train, thereby rendering such an accident as caused the
death of the deceased possible, and (2) that the safety chain '':~:m
mentioned in the evidence was inadequate, at least that
when it was put to the test it failed to perform the function :,:mtnh
for which it was intended. The court further stated in its
decision, in effect, that these two important matters were
uncontroverted in the evidence. The court must have also
thought that the evidence was undisputed that these two i~iij 1 1t
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elements, separately or in combination, proximately contributed to cause the accident and that the evidence was undisputed that they were a result of negligence on the defendant's part, in order to exercise its discretion in the
manner it did. We assert that the record amply discloses
that such was not the case and that the trial court abused
its discretion in granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
We recognize that the burden is upon us to establish
that the trial court was guilty of an abuse of discretion in
the ruling it made and that the ruling of the trial court
will be sustained unless such abuse of discretion is quite
clearly shown. Moser v. Zion's Co-op. Mercantile Inst.,
-Utah-, 197 P. (2) 136. We recognize that this court
can in law cases under its constitutional authority pass only
upon law questions and that it can only pass upon the trial
court's exercise of discretion as a matter of law. The trial
court having granted plaintiff's motion for a new trial for
insufficiency of the evidence, this court should examine the
record for the purpose of determining whether or not the
1
trial court, as a matter of law, abused its discretion in holding the evidence insufficient to justify the verdict of the
of the jury of "no cause of action" which it set aside. It
· is not the result of the proceedings in the lower court which
a this court must examine but the means whereby the lower
· court in its discretion reached such result.
~

j

Returning to the reasons given by the trial court for the
granting of plaintiff's motion for a new trial we point out
, that there never was any dispute but that the caboose was
~ being shoved ahead of the engine. The court says this made
~ the accident possible. It might just as well be said that if

!
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the caboose was not being shoved ahead of the engine and
if Jorgensen had not been riding the platform thereof and
if he had not in some manner fallen therefrom the accident
would not have happened. In his reasoning the learned trial
judge is talking about a condition; a condition that never was
in dispute, the dispute, however, being as to whether shoving
the caboose ahead of the engine was negligence on the part of
the defendant company proximately contributing to cause the
accident. This proposition has often been discussed in negligence cases and we think we need not elaborate on the distinction between a condition and a causative contributing
factor, other than to say that a condition, which in the
words of the court "rendered the accident possible," is not
what the law predicates actionable negligence on. There must
be negligence. There must be a causal connection. Unless
this is so the trial court should have directed a verdict for
the plaintiff simply because the caboose was being shoved
ahead of the engine and nothing more. It seems to us that
rejecting the jury's verdict for such reason is not the exercise of that sound, responsible judgment and judicial discretion which the court should exercise and which is the
only kind of discretion the court is entitled to indulge.
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As to the court's observations with relation to the safety
~:~~~!
chain that the evidence was undisputed "that it was inade:·:~~o:
quate," "that it failed to perform the function for which it
was intended when put to the test," the court is saying as a
:~~)u~l
matter of law that not only was the chain inadequate, which
:ilm~1
we will solely for the sake of the argument concede the
'il:iliat:
court under the evidence had the power to say, but also that
:\lt~]
there was a causal connection between its condition and thf
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accident; and the court further says that the evidence was
undisputed, that is, as a matter of law, that the chain was
"put to the test" and that it ''failed." There is no evidence
in the record that the chain was "put to the test" except by
an inference which the jury may have had power to draw
but did not in this case see fit to draw. We think the trial
court abused its discretion, in view of the record, to say that
the jury was required to draw the inference the court draws
and that it was the only inference that could be drawn. It
is true that Wilson, the deceased's brother-in-law, brother
of the widow, stated the chain could be dislodged by pushing on it from the top or striking it from the bottom, but
the County Coroner, Williams, a disinterested witness who
was investigating the accident in his official capacity in
company with the Sheriff of the County and his deputy,
testified that to disengage the chain it was necessary to take
hold of the hook with the hand, raise it in a vertical position,
and twist the hand slightly. The witness Croft testified to
deceased's position on the caboose platform in detail except
as to where his right hand was. In cases under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, at least, there can be no doubt
but that a jury has the right to draw inferences whenever
there is any reasonable basis in the evidence therefor. That
means that they may draw inferences in like manner that
do not impose liability upon defendant railroad companies
as readily as inferences that do. This court is well acquainted
with the slight amount of evidence which the Supreme Court
; of the United States has said will support an inference that
; imposes liability upon a defendant railroad company under
- the Federal Employers' Liability Act and we think, and it
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is a matter we propose to elaborate upon further, that this
legal proposition which has become so firmly established, of
necessity permits the jury to draw inferences that do not
impose liability as readily as inferences that do. The jury
could have as readily inferred from the evidence that
Jorgensen was toying with the hook with his right hand,
dislodged it, dropped it and fell when he reached for it,
as that he was thrown against the chain thus "putting it to
the test" and that it then "failed." There are other inferences than that just mentioned possible in the light of
the evidence in this case that would not impose liability
upon the defendant and which the jury may have drawn;
as the only direct evidence as to what happened was that
the safety chain was in place, that Jorgensen went through
the opening in the caboose railing, and that the safety chain
was hanging down afterwards. We think that the court
here, and in combination with its consideration of the
matter of shoving the caboose ahead of the engine, invaded
the province of the jury, and that in substituting its own
ideas as to what happened in place of the jury's finding
failed to exercise that sound, responsible judgment and
judicial discretion required of it. We think the detailed and
comprehensive statement of the evidence as set out in the
statement of facts as it pertains to the reasons given by the
court in granting the motion for a new trial warrants the
preceding assertion.
The trial court, as recommended in the Saltas case,
supra, has indicated and set forth the reasons for granting
plaintiff's motion for a new trial, that is, has indicated the
basis for the exercise of its discretion. Because it is not
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the ultimate result reached by the trial court which primarily
controls this court in determining the question now before
it, but whether or not the discretion of the trial court was
properly exercised, the specific reasons given by the trial
court should largely engage the attention of this court. The
trial court generalized when it stated that "there was no
doubt a misapprehension or disregard on the part of the
jury, either of the evidence, or the court's instructions, or
of both," but it may be that this court should and will adopt
the rule in examining the trial court's discretion that it will
look only to the specific reasons given. Such procedure does
not seem to us unreasonable nor does it seem unreasonable
to require the trial court in granting or denying a motion
for a new trial on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence to point out the insufficiency in detail. However,
partly because this may be considered by the appellate court
too narrow a view and unfair to the trial court and partly
because we feel that the full significance of the part played
by the chain and the shoving of the caboose ahead of the
engine cannot be appreciated without examining the rest
of the evidence in the case, we feel required to indulge
briefly in a discussion of the evidence pertaining to the four
issues involved.
With respect to Issue No. I, the claim that defendant
was negligent in requiring deceased to perform his duties
from the platform of the caboose, there can be no doubt
from the evidence that at the time and place in question it
was proper for Jorgensen to be on the platform of the
caboose and that this was the customary and usual place
for the two brakemen to be stationed as the train proceeded
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along the track on the Goshen Branch. It appears from the
evidence that there was no necessity for Jorgensen to place
himself as he did immediately in front of the opening in
the caboose platform. According to the evidence he could
have performed his duties by standing any place on the platform and, in fact, could have performed his duties by rid.
ing inside the caboose and if the weather had been inclement undoubtedly would have done so. There were windows in the end walls of the caboose on both sides. He
could have stationed himself to the rear of the platform
against the end wall of the caboose where he could have held
on to a grabiron as the other brakeman, Croft, was doing at
the time of the accident. There is very little evidence of
any particular significance one way or the other under this
issue as the undisputed evidence is that he was not in~
specting the train at the time of or immediately preceding
the accident and that the only duty he had to perform was to
ride and look forward and whistle as they approached
crossings; that it was, in fact, not necessary for him to
whistle as the engineer was at the time watching ahead
and whistling for all crossings, and customarily did watch
out for all crossings and whistle for them. Moreover, the
track was straight and the country was level. The engineer
and the fireman, if he was doing his duty, which is presumed,
would be looking forward for any obstructions such as
cattle in the right of way or cars that might be on any of
these country crossings. In short, whatever may have been
the extent of his duties to be performed on the platform
of the caboose, he was at the time of the accident not performin~ any duties at all that in any way entered into the

j!t

~~

,::n

~ID

,?!~a
.:r~f

.;l'it

.M~r

:lf!w~

iiitl1at!

21 ·'~~~~

~~W~i
~~ti

~~~
~~a
·~ma

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

33

1

accident as a causative factor so far as the evidence shows,
except perhaps his merely being on the platform, which in
and by itself is wholly insufficient to predicate negligence
upon.
As to Issue No. II, that the defendant failed to furnish
an adequate chain and hook across the opening in the end
railing of the caboose, we see no reason for us to discuss
this in detail in view of the fact that there is in evidence
the very chain involved (Defendant's Ex. 1) and an iron
eye (Defendant's Ex. 2) built to the same specifications as
the iron eye which was attached to the caboose at the time
of the accident. We do not think we can add anything to
the examination the court can itself make of these exhibits
when aided by the photographs of the caboose which are in
evidence.
With respect to Issue No. III, that the defendant was
negligent in shoving the caboose ahead of the engine, the
court is referred to the statement of facts wherein we set
up the two rules that were involved and indicate the respective theories which the plaintiff and the defendant had
with respect to this element of the case. We think the evidence clearly established the fact that the train was in
"work train service." It was what is known as a "work
extra," operating under "work train orders." Under Operating Rule 802 (J) of the defendant company this fact alone
permitted the caboose to be shoved ahead of the locomotive.
Under Rule 802 (J) it is also permissible to move a caboose
ahead of a locomotive when it is necessary to take cars to
or from a spur. Conductor Freeman testified that had it
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not been for the accident he would have gone as far as the
spur at Cox, which is a dead end track that can be entered
only from the north end. This crew did not know when it
left Idaho Falls whether or not it would have to take cars
from certain spurs, such as Cox, as the evidence is there
were no agents at these stations and the work orders they
had on the day in question simply authorized them to do
necessary switching between Idaho Falls and Goshen J unction. Quite obviously the intention of Freeman was to take
from the spur at Cox any cars that were loaded and ready
to be moved. Had he found a car or cars on the spur ready
to be moved and had the caboose been behind the engine, one
of two things would have been necessary, (1) either to drop
the caboose in against the standing cars on the spur, which
might not have been possible at all if the standing cars
nearly filled the spur, or (2) to leave the caboose behind the
engine ,reach in and get the cars, which would have resulted
in shoving the caboose ahead of the engine as they left Cox
and returned in a northerly direction. Freeman testified
that Cox was as far as he intended to go on the day in question. Rule 802· (J) does provide that a caboose even in
"work train service" or where necessary "to take cars to
or from a spur" shall not be shoved ahead of the engine for
any greater distance than necessary. The evidence is that
at best it would have been necessary to shove the caboose
ahead of the engine to the first siding at Gerrard, which
was one mile distant, had it been trailing at the point of
the accident and later at Cox. In working on a branch line
such as the Goshen Branch where cars may have to be
placed to or taken from three different spurs this would be
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a highly impractical operation and as all of the members of
the crew indicate would involve a great deal of extra switching. Counsel for the plaintiff, of course, would make capital
of the fact that after a fatal accident has occurred, the defendant company is more interested in simplifying its
operations than protecting the lives of its men, which we
think is a specious argument that may appeal to juries, but
ought not to appeal to either trial or appellate court judges.
The prohibition in Rule 802 (J) against handling cars
ahead of the engine implies that there is some danger attendant thereto and that this is a fact we readily admit; but
there are certain absolutely necessary and essential railroad
operations where it is considered safer by the company to
push a caboose ahead of the engine than to make what is
known as a running switch or "drop" sometimes designated
in railroad parlance as a "flying switch." As testified to
by Conductor Freeman, Rule 802 (H) which provides that
running switches or "drops" must not be made when practicable to avoid doing so, is in practical railroad operations
understood by railroad men to mean that they shall not
make drops except where absolutely necessary. It is true
that plaintiff's witness Paul Croft testified that a drop
was not hazardous, although he also stated that he knew it
was against the operating rules to make a drop unless
absolutely necessary (R. 80). The operating rules of the
company as well as the overwhelming weight of the testimony as given by other witnesses clearly indicates that
making a running switch or "drop" is a dangerous, hazardous
operation. Throughout our experience with this lawsuit we
have often thought how much better case the plaintiff would
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have had and how much more plaintiff's counsel would have :~~
made of it if Jorgensen had been killed while the crew was 'j!!lli
making a "drop." If Jorgensen had been killed while making !IIPl
a "drop" it would have been impossible for the defendant to ;~ 1
escape the charge that plaintiff's counsel would then make, :<~
viz, that the drop was unnecessary and could have been
avoided by pushing the caboose ahead of the engine-the 1~
very thing the defendant was doing at the time of this : .~
unfortunate accident. It may be helpful to the court, in so ~j~;~ea
far as the testimony in the record permits, to make an ex- 11~
planation of the manner in which a drop or running switch iil~l
is made. The witness Paul Croft testified as to how a drop ;~:(
is made ( R. 81, 82), which testimony with all its necessary ~: fu
implications show the operation to be performed in the :~~i
following manner : When a locomotive has a car behind it ·~na
which the crew desires to put in on a spur or dead end ~l):
track and the spur takes off from the main track in such uri
a manner that the car cannot be shoved into the spur, un- ~:,:
coupled, and the engine backed out, it becomes necessary ;::1!
to make a drop. Every member of the crew is required to ~~~
understand the movement that is to be made. The switches ~mi~
and the brakes to be used must be tested and a man must :~fu1
ride the car which is to be dropped, if necessary, in order to ;i:!l!
brake it to a stop on the spur. A man must always ride (J!
either the car or the locomotive in order to pull the coupling ~1r
pin at the exact moment necessary. As disclosed in Rule :1!
802 (H) running switches are absolutely prohibited in some .~~
circumstances. The operation consists of lining the switch 1~n1
for the main track when the locomotive is some distance ltar
away; the locomotive then gets up considerable speed headed ·~~

1

•1a
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for the switch ; just before it reaches the switch the engineer
slows it down slightly permitting the slack to run in against
the engine, which is necessary so that the trainman riding
the car or the footboard of the engine will be able to pull
the pin. The pin is pulled the moment the slack runs into
the engine and the engine then speeds up and runs away from
the free rolling car, across the switch and down the main
line. As soon as the locomotive crosses the switch the man
stationed at the switch throws it, thus diverting the free
rolling and approaching car into the spur where it is braked
to a stop by another trainman if that is necessary. When
the switches, brakes, the locomotive and all the other equipment function properly and the engineer and all the
members of the crew succeed in attaining the precise
coordination required, the drop is successfully made. It
does not take one experienced in railroad operations to
realize that there is danger in this operation owing to the
speed at which it is necessary to make the same ; the fact
that the car hits a curved track, that is, the spur, as soon
as the switch is thrown, which may lead to derailment and
the injury or killing of the man at the switch or on the car;
and the fact that the man at the switch, unless he exercises
extreme care, may throw the switch under the engine derailing it, or under the boxcar causing its derailment.
Furthermore, if it should happen that the car dropped in
on the spur does not clear the main line, the locomotive is
blocked and cannot move on the main line without first
backing up to the point where it corners with the standing
boxcar and then chaining the boxcar and dragging it forward onto the spur beyond the clearance point, which is in
itself a dangerous operation.
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We submit that practical railroad operations require
and switching can not be performed without, in some instances, either pushing a caboose ahead of a locomotive, or
making a drop. Defendant company has fully recognized the
danger incident to either operation. The men are all familiar
with the dangers of such operation and the company has,
so far as humanly possible, endeavored by the promulgation
of the two operating rules, 802 (J) and 802 (H), to reduce
to the absolute minimum the unavoidable and inescapable
hazards involved in this class of necessary and essential
railroad operation. Operating rules of a railroad company
do not fix standards of due care but, as has been held many
times, are evidence of what is due care under the circumstances. We think the rules here being discussed and the
manner in which the operation was being performed at
the time Jorgensen was killed reflect due care. The jury
thought so too, when they returned their verdict which
exculpated the defendant of any negligence contributing to
the accident. We think it was an abuse of discretion, as a
matter of law on the part of the court on this phase of the
case to· reject the accumulated experience of railroad men as
reflected in the rules, and the operation consistent therewith, that was being had at the time of the accident, and
to reject the jury's finding thereon, substituting its own
idea that shoving the caboose ahead of the engine was negligence, and holding that the evidence thereon was uncontradicted, and further holding, as it must have, that there
was a causal connection between this fact alone and the
accident.
As to Issue No. IV, which embraced the charge that
the defendant was negligent owing to the construction of
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the caboose in combination with the condition of the track
at and near the scene of the accident, we take the liberty
of referring the court to the detailed statement of the evidence set out in the statement of facts. It is a purely
factual situation in which we think we can be of little
assistance to the court in their consideration of the evidence,
which we suggest should include an examination of the
moving pictures and the still pictures in connection therewith which are in evidence.
From our examination of the previous decisions of this
court on the question here involved, it is apparent that each
case must be disposed of upon its own particular facts in
accordance with those principles of law which have thus
far been established in this jurisdiction. A brief reference
to some of the previously adjudicated cases seems called for.
The latest case which contained any extended discussion
on the principle of law involved was the case of Moser v.
Zion's Co-op. Mercantile Inst.,- Utah-, 197 P. (2) 136,
in which Mr. Justice Wolfe reviewed most of the early Utah
cases treating the subject. This case was later followed in
State v. Cooper,- Utah-, 201 P. (2) 764, without additional discussion of the question. In the Moser case Mr.
Justice Wolfe said:
"It is a matter now too well settled to admit of
any serious dispute that the question of granting or
denying a motion for new trial is a matter largely
within the discretion of the trial court. White v.
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 8 Utah 56, 29 P. 1030;
Van Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank, 48 Utah 606, 161
P. 50; Utah State National Bank v. Livingston, 69
Utah 284, 254 P. 781; Thompson v. Bown Live Stock
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Co., 74 Utah 1, 276 P. 651; Jensen v. Logan City,
89 Utah 347, 57 P. 2d 708. This rule applies whether
the motion is based upon insufficiency of the evidence or upon newly discovered evidence. See cases
above cited and Valiotis v. Utah-Apex Mining Co.,
55 Utah 151, 184 P. 802; Greco v. Gentile, 88 Utah
255, 53 P. 2d 1155; and Trimble v. Union Pacific
Stages, 105 Utah 4'57, 142 P. 2d 674. This court
cannot substitute its discretion for that of the trial
court. James v. Robertson, 39 Utah 414, 117 P. 1068,
2 N. G. C. A. 782. We do not ordinarily interfere
with rulings of the trial court in either granting or
denying a motion for new trial, and unless abuse of,
or failure to exercise, discretion on the part of the
trial judge is quite clearly shown, the ruling of the
trial judge will be sustained. Lehi Irrigation Co. v.
Moyle, et al., 4 Utah 327, 9 P. 867; White v. Union
Pacific Ry. Co., supra; Utah State Bank v. Livingston, supra; Clark v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., 73
Utah 486, 275 P. 582; and Trimble v. Union Pacific
Stages, supra. See also Harrison v. Sutter St. Ry.
Co., 116 Gal. 156, 161, 47 P. 1019, 1020."
The quotations from ·Mr. Justice Wolfe are supported by
the Utah decisions which he has cited and we have no quarrel
whatever with the principles collated and announced in the
Moser case. And as stated at the outset, we recognize further
that the court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the
trial court, which is another way of saying that the appellate
court is concerned with a question of law, and recognize that
the burden is upon the defendant in this case to show the
abuse of discretion charged. We concede that "the question
of granting or denying a motion for a new trial is a matter
largely within the discretion of the trial court," but we are
not prepared to admit that, as seems to be indicated in a few
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of the earlier Utah cases, the appellate court in any case
where it has, for instance, affirmed the trial court in denying a motion for a new trial where the grounds urged were
insufficiency of the evidence, would have in the same instance affirmed the trial court had the trial court granted
the motion. We think this is suggested in what Mr. Justice
Wolfe says further in the Moser case:
"The rule in this jurisdiction, early laid down
by this court is that where a motion for a new trial
is based upon insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, the trial court will not be held to
have abused its discretion in denying the motion
unless there is no substantial evidence in the record
to support the verdict. United States v. Brown, 6
Utah 115, 21 P. 461; James v. Robertson, 39 Utah
414, 117 P. 1068, 2 N. C. C. A. 782. Therefore, if
reasonable minds could have found as the jury did
in this case, from the evidence before it (the verdict
was for the plaintiff and the trial court denied the
motion for a new trial on the grounds of insufficiency
of evidence) , then we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's (sic)
motion for a new trial on the grounds of insufficiency
of the evidence to support the verdict." (Italics ours.)
And further:
"The determination of this ultimate fact (which
of the two drivers was across the center line of the
highway) was for the jury. And the jury having
determined this question in plaintiff's favor and
the trial court having denied defendants' motion for
a new trial, this court cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion unless there was no substantial
evidence to support the verdict, or in other words,
that all reasonable minds must agree that it was
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the plaintiff, and not defendant Rogers, who tramgressed the center line of the highway."
The court concluded that there was substantial evidence
to support the verdict of the jury and that the trial court
therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's
motion for a new trial based upon insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. We think that it follows, not
necessarily perhaps in every case but in most all cases, that
the trial court should be held to have abused its discretion
when it grants a motion for a new trial in the face of evidence
which amply supports the jury's verdict.
In the case of James v. Robertson, 39 Utah 414, 117 P. '
1068, 2 N . .C. C. A. 782, Mr. Justice Straup said in a separate
concurring opinion :
"Whatever legal discretion may rightfully be
exercised by the trial court in passing on motions for
a new trial, I think it is clear that when the evidence,
both in point of law and of fact, is sufficient to justify
the verdict, and the trial court is satisfied of such
sufficiency, he may not then, in his discretion, set it
aside on the sole ground that, had he tried the case
on the facts, he would have reached a different conclusion. To hold otherwise is to hold that the court
in its discretion may invade the duty to decide by
setting aside verdicts until he has found a jury to
agree with him."

It seems to us that the preservation of the right to trial
by jury requires the trial court in most cases to recognize
and uphold the verdict of a jury when that verdict is supported by substantial, competent evidence even though the
record is such that the jury may well have found otherwise.
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Certainly the discretion the trial court is permitted to indulge is not a whim or a personal dissatisfaction with the
result. The James case, supra, was one wherein the verdict
was for the plaintiff and defendant's motion for a new trial
was denied and such action was affirmed by this court, the
court using the following language in the main opinion :
"In cases like the one before us, where all other
assignments fail, the only available assignment is
that the evidence does not justify the v~rdict of the
jury, and where the trial court has refused to grant
a new trial, all that we are authorized to do is to
look into the evidence to ascertain whether there is
any substantial evidence in support of every material
element which plaintiff is required to establish in
order to recover. If there is such evidence, then, so
far as we are concerned, the verdict must stand, although in our judgment, if we passed on the facts,
the verdict upon the whole evidence should have been
to the contrary."
By this same process of reasoning it seems to us to
follow that where, as in the instant case, abuse of discretion
is charged as a result of the court's granting a motion for a
new trial because of insufficiency of the evidence, the court
should be held to have abused its discretion unless from the
record it appears that the evidence either failed to support
the jury's verdict or was of such questionable character as
entitled the court in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to say that the verdict was not so supported.
In White v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., an early case reported in 8 Utah 56, 29 P. 1030, the Supreme -court affirmed
the trial court in granting the defendant's motion for a
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new trial in a case where the evidence seemed to be fairly
evenly balanced. While such a result might be properly
reached by an appellate court in some cases, we do not admit
that the rule is that upon substantially conflicting evidence
the court in every case or in most cases, should be upheld in
granting a motion for a new trial.
The language in the case of Utah State Bank v. Livingston, 69 Utah 284, 2'54 P. 781, indicates that this court then
took the view that where the evidence was substantially
conflicting the appellate court must hold as a matter of
law that no abuse of discretion is shown whether the motion
for a new trial had been either granted or denied. Possibly
no such holding was intended by the decision in this case,
but if it was, we submit that it was wrong and that if such
principle has become fixed in Utah law we suggest that it
now be re-examined by this court. We might add in passing
that the Utah State Bank case was a case wherein the defendant recovered a verdict which was set aside on plaintiff's motion on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence,
and the case cited in support of the general statement made
in the opinion was the case of Valiotis v. Utah-Apex Mining
Co., 55 Utah 151, 184 P. 802, which was a case where defendant's motion for a new trial, after a verdict for the
plaintiff was denied, this court holding that the court did
not abuse its discretion for the reason that there was substantial evidence to support the plaintiff's verdict.
A good general statement is set forth in 39 Am. Jur.,
New Trial, Sec. 134, p. 143, as follows:
"As a general rule, where the evidence appears
to be conflicting, a verdict will not be set aside un-
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less it is clearly and palpably against the weight of
the evidence or unless, as a matter of law, the conclusion could not have been reasonably reached by
reasonable minds. In case of conflicting testimony,
the court proceeds upon the theory that the jury had
a right to accept all the testimony of the successful
side as true and reject that of the other side as untrue, mistaken or unsatisfactory, unless the testimony, including the circumstances and probabilities,
reveals a situation that proves the testimony of the
successful side to be inherently wrong. It cannot be
said· that the denial of a motion for a new trial on
the ground that the verdict is against the law and
the evidence is wrong where the evidence was strongly conflicting on several controlling points and its
weight depended in no small manner on the credibility of the witnesses."
This, we contend, should be the guide to a trial court
in exercising its discretion and a departure therefrom should
be considered an abuse of discretion. No better reason could
be given for the denial of a motion for a new trial on the
grounds of insufficiency of the evidence than that the evidence was substantially conflicting and entitled the jury to
find either way, but it does not follow that in every case,
or even in most cases, a court is acting within its discretion
in granting a motion for a new trial where there is substantially conflicting evidence such as would readily justify
the jury in returning a verdict for either side.
In the instant case we insist that the evidence amply
justified the jury in returning a verdict in favor of the defendant "no cause of action." The proper exercise of a trial
court's discretion should not go to the extent of permitting
the court to upset a jury's verdict which is amply supported
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by the evidence, and to continue to do so until the jury
finally returns a verdict to the court's liking. This is what
Mr. Justice Straup was condemning in the Robertson case,
supra, when he said, "To hold otherwise is to hold that the
court in its discretion may invade the duty to decide by
setting aside verdicts until he has found a jury to agree
with him."
Each case presenting the question here involved must
to a large extent rest upon its own particular facts. This
becomes readily apparent from an examination of the Utah
cases. In the V aliotis case, supra, the court said :

"* * * The trial judge ought not, as a general rule, to disturb the verdict if in his opinion there
is substantial evidence to support it. 'To set aside
the verdict in such cases would be to invade the
province of the jury in whom is vested the power
to decide all questions of fact and to whom all evidence thereon is to be addressed."
The court quoted the following rule with approval from
20 R. C. L. 277 :
"As the jury is the exclusive judge of the evidence, it must in reason be the exclusive judge of
what constitutes the preponderance of the evidence,
and, when that judgment is reached upon evidence
sufficient to support a verdict, it should not be disturbed by the court."
We respectively submit that the lower court abused its
discretion in granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial and
in holding, in the words of Section 104-40-7, U. C. A. 1943,
that there had been "such a plain disregard by the jury of
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the instructions or the evidence, or both, * * * as to
~~ satisfy the court that the verdict was rendered under a mis11i;
apprehension of such instructions, or under the influence
- - · of passion and prejudice." In the exercise of sound judicial
~::: discretion the court should not have been so satisfied to the
,! extent required in Section 104-40-7. The reasons given by
the court in its written decision granting the motion for a
new trial (R. 179, 180), and as set out and discussed above,
··.;.
seem to us to conclusively establish the fact that the trial
court was not indulging its discretion as it should.
~·
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We have thus far refrained from considering the significance of the fact, as it relates to the sole assignment of error
herein made, that this is a case under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. Since the amendment of 1939 to the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, the bar and the bench, under the
compulsion of the Supreme Court of the United States and
as a result of their exercise of an unquestioned prerogative,
have been forced to a radical revision of their long held
understanding and application of the rules dealing with
directed verdicts in connection with cases tried under the
act. We now urge upon this court the proposition that in
F. E. L. A. cases the restrictions placed upon trial courts
in the matter of directing verdicts by ·the Supreme Court of
the United States affects, controls and curtails the right of
trial courts to exercise as fully the discretion to grant new
trials for insufficiency of the evidence as they have heretofore been considered to possess. Let us concede that the
court in passing upon a motion for a directed verdict never
had and does not have any discretion, and in passing upon
a motion for a new trial for insufficiency of the evidence
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has always had and still has some discretion to exercise. How
much discretion, however, is left to the trial court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial in F. E. L.A. cases?
Do the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
permit a trial court, state or federal, while following the
concepts laid down by the Supreme Court of the United
States relative to directing verdicts, to "exercise its discretion" in setting aside the jury's verdict if the same is supported by any substantial evidence? Can the trial court accomplish by indirection what, in fact, amounts to a nullification of the holdings of the Supreme Court of the United
States in F. E. L. A. cases by setting aside jury verdicts
where there is substantial evidence in the record to support
the same? Would the Supreme Court of the United States
tolerate a trial court's setting aside a verdict for an employe
for insufficiency of evidence in any case where the evidence
was such as impelled a submission of the case to the jury
in the first instance? In rare cases possibly so, but we believe that the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States by necessary implication absolutely prohibit the
application of state practice and procedure so as to curtail
the substantive rights of the employe under the F. E. L.A.,
whether such application is made at the time a motion for
a directed verdict is presented or subsequently upon application for a new trial on the grounds of insufficient evidence.
Employment plus injury, under the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, means an F. E. L. A. case almost invariably is· submitted to the jury; so much so, in
fact, that at least one Justice has accused that court of
rendering "lip service" to the proposition that "negligence
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must still be shown." In Wilkerson v.· McCa't'thy, 336 U.
;: S. 53, Mr. Justice Jackson said :

''* * *

In this opinion the court continues

to pay lip service to the doctrine that liability in these
cases is to be based only upon fault."

~

But we wish to point out that this was said in a dissent.
In Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion, separately concurring with
the main opinion in the case, he said :
"The criterion governing the exercise of our
discretion in granting or denying certiorari is not
who loses below but whether the jury function in
passing upon disputed questions of fact and in drawing inferences from proven facts has been respected.
The historic role of the jury in performing that func..:
tion * * * is being restored in this important
class of cases." (Italics ours.)

__

.~

_
_

.-

.......

:·~

::

.~

..
..

f~f

We realize the court was talking about the power of a
trial court to direct a verdict, as it is in some but not all of
the quotations which will be hereinafter made, but it is our
position that this emphasis on respecting the power of the
jury to determine disputed questions of fact and drawing
inferences from proven facts necessarily goes to the extent
of pervading and curtailing to considerable extent the theory
that trial courts may grant new trials for insufficiency of
the evidence. If this is the case, it is of course binding upon
all state courts, and will compel this court to re-examine its
previous pronouncements upon the power of trial courts to
grant new trials "in their discretion" for insufficiency of
the evidence. State courts are governed in their construction, application and interpretation of the F. E. L. A. by
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the decisional law of the federal courts. Klinge v. Southern
Pac. Co., 89 Utah 284, 57 P. (2) 367.
We think the fact is sometimes lost sight of that if a
jury is permitted to draw inferences whenever, as the
Supreme Court has said, there is any "reasonable" basis in
the evidence therefore, so as to impose liability upon the defendant railroad company, they are equally entitled to draw
such inferences when they do not impose liability. We think
not even the Supreme Court of the United States can apply
one rule where an employe prevails and apply another where
the defendant railroad company has prevailed. And if, as
their decisions clearly indicate, they would not tolerate a
trial judge upsetting a jury's verdict in favor of an employe
where there was any reasonable basis in the evidence therefor, they cannot consistently tolerate such ruling on the part
of a trial court where the verdict has been in favor of the
defendant railroad company and there was a reasonable basis
in the evidence therefor.
We would like to quote briefly from some of the cases
that have been decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States during the recent development just referred to. In
Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 3.21 U.S. 29, 88 L. Ed. 520,
64 Sup. Ct. 409, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal~ considered the evidence which led to a verdict for the~~:~
in the District Court, and while conceding the negligence,
reversed upon the ground that they considered there was no
causal connection between such negligence and the accident.
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and,
among other things, said :
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"No court is then justified in substituting its
conclusions for those of the twelve jurors.

* * * * *

"It is not the function of a court to search the
record for conflicting circumstantial evidence nor
to take the case away from the jury on the theory that
the proof gives equal support to inconsistent and
uncertain inferences.

* * * * *

·.

"Courts are not free to re-weigh the evidence
and set aside the jury verdict merely because the
jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are
more reasoruible."

~

This is what the Supreme Court of the United States had
:: to say about the Seventh 'Circuit Court of Appeals, which
was doing in an F. E. L. A. case exactly what the honorable trial court did in the case before this court. They had
this further to say :
"Thus to enter a judgment for respondent Dothwithstanding the verdict is to deprive petitioner of
the right to a jury trial. No reason is apparent why
we should abdicate our duty to protect and guard
that right in this case."

This, we say, affords unquestioned support to the con·
, tention we herein make, viz, that the Supreme Court of the
~, United States will not tolerate trial judges disturbing the
~
jury's verdict whenever there is any reasonable basis in
"' the evidence for the verdict, any more than they now tolerate
11
'
directed verdicts.
In Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. S. 645, 90 L. Ed. 916, 66
Sup. Ct. 740, it was held that whenever there was ever any
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evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict the function of an
appellate court was exhausted. The court said:

"It would be an undue invasion of the jury's
historic function for an appellate court to weigh the
conflicting evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and arrive at a conclusion opposite from the
one reached by the jury. * * * Where there is
an evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict, the jury
is free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent with its conclusion. * * * It being
immaterial that the court might draw a contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is more reasonable."
In Ellis v. Union Pacific R. Co., 329 U. S. 649, 91 L.
Ed. 572, 67 Sup. Ct. 598, it was said :
''The choice of conflicting versions of the way
the accident happened, the decision as to which witness was telling the truth, the inferences to be drawn
-from uncontroverted as well as controverted facts,
are questions for the jury. Once there is a reasonable
basis in the record for concluding that there was
negligence which caused the injury, it is irrelevant
that fair minded men might reach a different conclusion. For then it would be an invasion of the
'jury's function for an appellate court to draw contrary inferences or to conclude that a different conclusion would be more reasonable."
In Coray v. Southern Pac. Co., 335 U. S. 520, where
this court reviewed the evidence and held, as a matter of
law, that the defective equipment complained of did not
proximately cause or contribute to decedent's death and
sustained the trial court in granting a directed verdict, the
Supreme Court of the United States reversed and reiterated
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the principles set forth above, and referred to the discussion by this court as an indulgence in "dialectical subtleties"
which served no useful interpretative purpose of the meaning
, of the F. E. L. A. From this we conclude the Supreme Court
I·
of the United States is determined that the jury shall de': termine questions of fact in F. E. L. A. cases and that
~
neither trial nor appellate courts shall turn their training
and experience to a consideration of the facts.
~'

-:.:

~·

In Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry. Co., 319 U. S. 350,
87 L. Ed. 1444, 63 Sup. Ct. 1062, the Supreme Court said:
"The right to trial by jury is 'a basic and fundamental feature of our system of federal jurisprudence.' Jacobs v. New York City, 315 U. S. 372. It
is part and parcel of the remedy afforded railroad
workers under the Employers Liability Act. Reasonable care and cause and effect are as elusive here
as in other fields. But the jury has been chosen as
the appropriate tribunal to apply those standards
to the facts of these personal injuries. That method
of determining the liability of the carriers and of
placing on them the cost of these industrial accidents
may be crude, archaic, and expensive as compared
with the more modern systems of workmen's compensation. But however inefficient and backward it
may be, it is the system which Congress has provided.
To deprive these workers of the benefit of a jury
trial in close or doubtful cases is to take away a
goodly portion of the relief which Congress has afforded them."
Again we say that we are not unaware of the fact
that the quotations herein set out were made in connection with a consideration of trial courts directing verdicts
and appellate courts sustaining them in such action or
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reversing cases for what they considered insufficiency of
the evidence and were not made in connection with a situation where a trial judge upsets a jury's verdict because "in
his discretion" he is dissatisfied with the sufficiency of the
evidence. That the whole problem is a federal question cannot be doubted. That the determination of the Supreme
Court of the United States to make certain that the verdicts
of juries in F. E. L.A. cases shall not be disturbed by courts
under any device, pretext or application of any state rule
or principle of practice and procedure is made abundantly
clear in the above decisions. That neither trial nor appellate
courts can weigh the evidence, draw inferences from conflicting evidence, and decide the facts, but that this is the
exclusive prerogative of the jury, is the clear and unmistakable intent of the Supreme Court of the United States in
interpreting the legislation Congress saw fit to enact with
the F. E. L. A. A rule of practice and procedure, together
with the interpretation and construction that may be placed
thereon by a state court, which defeats the "administration"
of the F. E. L.A. as the Supreme Court of the United States
has said it shall be administered, ought not to be any longer
maintained by this court. Due regard for the exclusive
right of the United States Supreme Court to determine how
the Federal Employers' Liability Act shall be "administered"
and to pass final judgment on this exclusively federal question compels all state courts, it seems to us, to sweep away
any and all rules of practice and procedure that in any way
and in any degree curtail the substantive rights of the
parties under the F. E. L. A. as declared by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
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To summarize our contentions we assert first, that the
trial court abused its discretion in granting the plaintiff's
motion for a new trial and that this is so even though the
problem be examined without any consideration whatever
of the fact that the instant case is one brought under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act; and secondly, that the
case being one brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the trial court does not have that "discretion" in
granting a motion for a new trial for insufficiency of the
evidence, where their is any substantial evidence to support
the verdict, that it has heretofore under the statutes and
decisions of this court been considered to have, in cases not
brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and
we respectfully submit that this case should be remanded
to the trial court with directions to reinstate the verdict
of the jury of "no cause of action."

Respectfully submitted,

BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. CORAY,
Counsel for
Defendant and Appellant.
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